To understand power relations, it is important to consider that power is an attribute, and whoever has it at a given moment is in the condition of dominant and whoever is under its exercise is dominated. Moreover, we must consider that these positions are interchangeable, changing when relations of force change. Power relations represent the pursuit of supremacy through knowledge, with struggles for better positioning in the social structure. In this study, we analyze the effects of disciplinary power on daily (...) practices of nurses and physicians in the hospital environment, more specifically in intensive care units. From the perspective of disciplines, power is exercised in a discreet, modest, calculated and permanent way, through the establishment of rules and norms. In this context, despite the strong appreciation of a medical‐centered model, it is observed that nurses gain visibility through knowledge and the defense of institutional norms and rules, which can generate tensions in daily professional practices. (shrink)

In this article, the author focuses on the allocation of decision-making authority between parents and physicians. She argues that parents should have substantial room to decide whether genetic testing is good for their child and that they may appropriately consider interests in addition to those of their child in making such choices. A physician, however, may refuse to act pursuant to parental views about testing, when in the physician's view, the parents' choices would pose a risk of significant harm to (...) the child. The balance of control between parents and physicians is illustrated by discussion of a series of case vignettes. Refusal to perform requested testing is most often warranted for testing for carrier status and for genetic predisposition to late onset disease. The author concludes her analysis by discussing why it is appropriate to give increasing deference to the views of the child as the child grows older. (shrink)

In the two centuries covered by this volume, from about AD 250 to 450, the Roman Empire suffered a period of chaos followed by drastic administrative and military reorganization. Simultaneously Christianity emerged as a new religious force, to be first recognized by Constantine and then eventually to become the official religion of the Roman state. The old pagan culture continued to provide the basis for education and the staple literary diet of the leisured classes; but it now had perforce to (...) coexist and indeed to compete with a new, specifically Christian-oriented literature. These and associated developments are reflected in the Latin books of the period. Of the traditional forms and genres, some atrophied, some were transformed and invigorated; and yet others, such as autobiography in something like the modern sense, emerged in response to the pressures of the times. Professor Browning's masterly and comprehensive survey is mostly concerned with pagan literature, but takes into account Christian texts written in classical forms and directed at classically educated readers. The volume ends with a chapter on Apuleius by Professor Walsh, followed by a brief Epilogue from the same hand, sketching the part played by classical studies in the formation of the Latin literature of the Middle Ages. (shrink)

In a preceding paper [1] it was shown that quantum logic, given by the tableaux-calculus Teff, is complete and consistent with respect to the dialogic foundation of logics. Since in formal dialogs the special property of the 'value-definiteness' of propositions is not postulated, the calculus $T_{eff}$ represents a calculus of effective (intuitionistic) quantum logic. Beginning with the tableaux-calculus the equivalence of $T_{eff}$ to calculi which use more familiar figures such as sequents and implications can be investigated. In this paper we (...) present a sequents-calculus of Gentzen-type and a propositional calculus of Brouwer-type which are shown to be equivalent to $T_{eff}$ . The effective propositional calculus provides an interpretation for a lattice structure, called quasi-implicative lattice. If, in addition, the value-definiteness of quantum mechanical propositions is postulated, a propositional calculus is obtained which provides an interpretation for a quasi-modular orthocomplemented lattice which, as is well-known, has as a model the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space. (shrink)

This paper is based on a semantic foundation of quantum logic which makes use of dialog-games. In the first part of the paper the dialogic method is introduced and under the conditions of quantum mechanical measurements the rules of a dialog-game about quantum mechanical propositions are established. In the second part of the paper the quantum mechanical dialog-game is replaced by a calculus of quantum logic. As the main part of the paper we show that the calculus of quantum logic (...) is complete and consistent with respect to the dialogic semantics. Since the dialoggame does not involve the 'excluded middle' the calculus represents a calculus of effective (intuitionistic) quantum logic. In a forthcoming paper it is shown that this calculus is equivalent to a calculus of sequents and more interestingly to a calculus of propositions. With the addition of the 'excluded middle' the latter calculus is a model for the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space. (shrink)

For--whatever our eventual sphere of control--the realm of fact is there first and always for our docility. Observ- ing is mental submission. Bacon is right: to master nature we must first obey her. Facts are to be received, learned, set in order: but who will say they are to be understood? They cannot be deduced: they are what they are. Here we meet the problem of these lectures. If man is to fathom his destiny, not to say guide it, must (...) his thinking not penetrate world fact as well as world law? And is this possible? (shrink)

If any single controlling principle can be derived from what R. P. Blackmur has called the most sustained, eloquent, and original piece of literary criticism in existence, Henry James's Prefaces, it is that criticism is a creative act. This principle seems both sufficiently important and ambiguous to warrant a close examination of its meaning and consequences. In what follows, then, I propose to examine a theory of criticism as creativity, referring not only to James's remarks but also, and in particular, (...) to an earlier and some ways more accessible version which we find in Robert Browning's work. Undoubtedly, in the great realm of speculation open to the critical theorist there are grander tasks which one could set oneself. Whether there are more difficult ones is another question. As it is, despite their peculiar particularity, both Browning and James are ambitious writers who refuse to be contained within narrow limits. Both demand an awareness of the context of critical theory, a sense of the problematical nature of criticism and the perplexities of the creative act. It is these latter considerations with which I propose to begin. (shrink)